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1. INTRODUCTION
The key question in the current debate on capital account liberalisation (CAL) and international
financial integration for developing countries is that of the impact on poverty. The problem for
policymakers, both at the national level and internationally for the multilateral institutions, is that
the link between CAL and poverty is far from clear. Despite the adoption of poverty reduction as
a central objective by the Bretton Woods institutions, analysis of macroeconomic policy in terms
of poverty impacts is yet to become a central approach. This paper aims to make a first
contribution to assessing the linkages between CAL and poverty, with a view to both indicating
some areas in which further research is necessary and outlining some policy implications.
Section 2 assesses the orthodox (growth-focused) view of the costs and benefits of CAL, and
briefly surveys the considerable empirical literature. The main finding is that the net growth
benefit of CAL – which is the underlying assumption of much of the policy-driven analysis of the
multilateral institutions – is far from being established for the poorer countries. Sections 3 and 4
then trace the impact of capital flows on poverty, through government finances and changes in
financial markets respectively. A number of serious potential costs of CAL are outlined, and the
final section draws some conclusions for policy-makers and researchers on this basis.
2. THE GROWTH-FOCUSED VIEW
The last five years have seen a broad movement in policy attitudes to CAL. The East Asian crisis
has been largely responsible for a re-evaluation of evidence on its costs and benefits. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has backed away from the strong pro-liberalisation statements
of the annual Bank-Fund meetings in 1997, and pressure to amend its Articles of Agreement to
reflect that position appears to have dissipated. While there remain both strong proponents and
fierce critics of CAL, however, those occupying what Eichengreen (2000) calls the “messy
middle” now form a majority. This position combines acknowledgement of both potential benefits
(in the form of growth) and potential costs (crises). According to which is most emphasised, it can
cover a range of views from the scepticism of Stiglitz (2000) to the more orthodox ‘cautious’
liberalisation standpoint urged by Citrin & Fischer (2000).
The arguments for growth benefits are standard. First, it is argued that the access to international
capital markets provided by CAL has many advantages. Countries are able to enjoy potentially
higher domestic investment. More efficient domestic financial markets may lead to higher quality
investment also. The diversification of domestic risks allowed by CAL leads to more efficient and
stable allocation of capital, and international trade can be conducted with reduced currency risk.
The second key argument is that capital inflows generate a market discipline on governments that
can have growth-enhancing effects for inflation, fiscal deficits and other policy variables. The
third reason stems from the rather crude ‘inevitability argument’ – that “capital account
liberalization, along with deregulation of domestic financial markets, is an inevitable step on the
path of development – all the industrialized countries by now have open capital accounts” (Citrin
& Fischer, 2000, p.1137). There must therefore be a growth benefit since the countries with stable
growth have all liberalised. Finally, the costs of CAL within this growth-focused view occur
solely through greater instability, and most strikingly in the form of financial crises.
The policy implications of this approach are well-known, and not surprising. Since there exist
growth benefits, countries should liberalise – at least eventually. Since there are costs to instability
and crises, and CAL may increase the likelihood of these, a combination of appropriate
sequencing and institutional capacity-building are necessary to ensure the benefits accrue. Crises
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the operation of illiquid financial institutions and the importance of market ‘sentiment’ in driving
capital flows. The considerable literature on sequencing, and the Financial Stability Forum’s
momentum behind the international codes and standards point the way forward for developing
countries to attain the growth benefits of CAL.
Empirical findings on growth and CAL
At this stage we should distinguish more clearly between different types of capital flow: between
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment (FPI – consisting of equity flows and bond
flows) and foreign bank lending (FBL). Briefly, FDI is by its nature the least easily reversible,
short-term bank lending the most vulnerable to reversal, while FPI (especially equity flows) can
also exhibit high volatility. Table 1 illustrates the relative volume of these flows. FDI has tended
to concentrate on relatively few regions (China, East Asia and Latin America) - ten countries host
three-quarters of the flows to developing countries. However, if we take into account the relative
size of the host countries, we find that as a share of gross domestic product or fixed capital
formation, the ratios for FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa are similar to those for Latin America and
actually higher than the ratios for Asia. FPI and FBL do seem to be biased towards MICs rather
than LICs, even when corrected for market size. This reflects in part the under-development of
capital markets and bank sectors in poorer countries.
Table 1: Value of capital flows to developing countries, US$bn
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Net private capital flows 123.8 119.3 181.9 152.6 193.3 212.1 149.1 64.3
    Net direct investment 31.3 35.5 56.8 82.7 97.0 115.9 142.7 131.0
    Net portfolio investment 36.9 51.1 113.6 105.6 41.2 80.8 66.8 36.7
    Net bank lending* 55.6 32.7 11.5 -35.8 55.0 15.4 -69.4 -103.4
Net official flows 36.5 22.3 20.1 1.8 26.1 -0.8 24.4 41.7
Changes in reserves -61.5 -51.9 -75.9 -66.7 -120.2 -109.1 -61.2 -34.7
Current account balance -85.1 -75.6 -116.0 -72.0 -91.0 -91.8 -87.1 -59.2
Source: FitzGerald, 1999. * denotes ‘other net investment’ in the original source table (IMF, 1999).
Quinn (1997) presents what he refers to as “the first systematic demonstration of a robust
correlation between change in capital account regulation and long-run economic growth” (p.537).
Rodrik (1998) found no such correlation. Rossi (1999) uses a different specification and finds that
the existence of controls is associated with reduced growth rates. The limitations of econometrics
for considering such relationships are clear, however, when so many (especially policy-related)
factors would require inclusion to satisfactorily mitigate the risk of omitted variable bias.
Prevailing attitudes at the BWIs may also have affected the relationship between capital account
policies and multilateral support in certain periods. Moreover, it is not simply a question of
regulation; the interesting issue concerns episodes when liberalisation does indeed lead to inflows,
rather than having no noticeable effect.
1 For that reason, it may be more useful to consider
research which focuses on the particular channels through which CAL may contribute to
economic growth.
                                                       
1 Liberalisation in Bangladesh may be a case in point. However, it is clearly most useful for policy-related work to
focus on those cases where inflows do occur. The question of countries exhibiting such poor (risk-adjusted) rates of
return as not to attract outside capital regardless of regulations is a separate one. Without assuming that inflows
always occur, it is these cases we are most concerned with and hence the analysis in the following sections assumes
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Levine & Zervos (1998) find no evidence of long-run effects of CAL on the growth of the capital
stock (which would be expected to yield a higher long-run economic growth path). Klein & Olivei
(1999) do find a “statistically significant and economically relevant effect of open capital
accounts on financial deepness, and through this channel, on economic growth” (p.1). They make
the standard argument that through a more efficient market, which reduces problems of
asymmetric information and transaction costs, a greater volume of savings is mobilised to more
productive purpose. However, they refuse to draw the simple policy conclusion that this would
seem to imply – namely, that CAL in developing countries yields growth benefits.
This is because they do not find “a significant effect of capital account liberalization on financial
deepness among countries which are not members of the OECD” (p.2, emphasis added). In other
words, the finding does not hold for developing countries. Klein & Olivei suggest attributing this
to the absence in developing countries of “a constellation of economic, legal and social
institutions” (p.2), which is consistent with both the sequencing arguments for ensuring
macroeconomic stabilisation and financial liberalisation first, with the findings of King & Levine
(e.g. 1993) on financial development and growth, and lends support to the G7’s codes- and
standards-based approach to the reform of the global financial architecture.
Kraay (1998) takes the analysis a step further. After first confirming the absence of evidence of
growth benefits of CAL, he investigates two common interpretations. First, he considers the view
that benefits will only be obtained by countries with sufficiently ‘good’ policies and institutions.
This he dismisses on the basis of a number of econometric analyses, from which the only positive
finding is that “investment is significantly more likely to increase in countries with bad
policies/institutions than in good countries” (p.24). We return to this result in section 3, and offer
an explanation for what may seem counter-intuitive initially. Second, he examines the view (of,
e.g. Stiglitz, 2000) that the growth benefits of CAL are obscured by the costs of associated
volatility. This, too, he dismisses, finding that there is “little evidence that the volatility of capital
flows is significantly higher in financially open economies” (p.25). However, these results does
not allow for initial levels of financial development. They therefore ignore the relatively greater
impact of volatility on countries where the corporate and especially financial sectors are relatively
weak or underdeveloped.
Durham (2000a, b, c) has explicitly attempted to assess the difference between MICs and LICs in
terms of the impact of CAL. In the first (survey) paper, he notes that an important and obvious but
nevertheless largely omitted variable in econometric work has been the initial level of financial
development. In particular, he suggests the existence of ‘threshold’ levels of financial
development which may have to be reached in order for the gains from liberalisation to be felt.
Proceeding on this basis, he draws the following conclusions in the second paper:
•  FDI has an ambiguous effect on growth.
•  FPI has a generally negative impact on long-run growth. Distinguishing between MICs
and LICs on the basis of initial financial development, and between equity flows and bond
flows, this is refined to:
(i)  for higher levels of previous stock market development (i.e. for some MICs but no
LICs), volume of equity flows are more likely to be positive for growth;
(ii)  volatility of equity flows is negatively correlated with growth in all cases;
(iii)  net bond flows and net equity flows have no impact on domestic savings rates.
These results certainly imply support for the proposition that some countries (i.e. the LICs) do
indeed have financial sectors too underdeveloped to liberalise their capital accounts. However,
there is also a lack of significant support for liberalisation by MICs either. Durham (2000c)
concentrates solely on the effects of stock market development on investment and growth.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 5
Similarly to Klein & Olivei, he finds first that it is higher income countries which drive the
overall positive relationship between stock market development and growth.
2 Initial GDP and
country credit ratings are significant, which implies that the gains accrue to already wealthier
countries. Moreover, private investment rates respond to stock market valuations in higher
income countries only. In other words, the increased investment and growth benefits of equity
flow liberalisation are present to an extent in some MICs, but cannot be observed in lower
income countries.
It must be concluded on the basis of this literature survey that the (net) benefits of CAL for
developing countries have not been established. Indeed, since a significant body of work has
searched for these, it is more accurate to say that these benefits may not necessarily exist for
poorer countries. This is in contrast to the common view that benefits will accrue to those
countries who follow the right policies, and who have the right institutional and supervisory
standards in place (a view is specifically refuted by the work of Kraay, 1998). The one benefit that
seems to withstand scrutiny is through the efficiency of international finance, in the form of a
lowered cost of capital (Stulz, 1999).
Of concern is the possibility that liberalisation may not only generate no net growth benefits, but
that it may also have significant costs in poverty terms. This paper focuses now on CAL’s impact
on poverty. In particular we are concerned with the volatility of the domestic economy, for it is
here that the costs of CAL are to be seen. The volatility of the domestic macroeconomy, in
government finances and private investment in particular, responds not necessarily to the
volatility of capital flows but rather to their undeniable potential for devastating volatility. The
danger of sudden and massive outflows conditions and restricts the behaviour of both government
and the private sector. Their behaviour is detailed in sections 3 and 4 respectively.
3. IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT FINANCES AND POLICY
Full CAL for low-income countries involves allowing not only FDI but capital inflows to bond
and equity markets and to the banking sector, which can create serious restrictions on
governments. As noted earlier, the paper focuses on those episodes where inflows do actually
occur; and it is the short-term flows that pose particular difficulties for host countries in terms of
policymaking. Two different potential impacts are detailed in this section, reductions in each of
the level and the stability of government finances. To this end, it is helpful to consider the general
position of developing country government finances before beginning to assess the effects of
liberalisation.
Government finances
Reductions in the level of government finances will involve spending cuts that can have
significant costs for the poor. Biggs (1998) shows that fiscal cutbacks in developing countries
have historically targeted investment most heavily, while providing relative (but far from
complete) protection to wages and transfers. Long-term impacts on health and education
provision when investment is reduced can be serious. Governments are also faced with the
highest levels of poverty and social deprivation, making these social expenditures crucial.
Reduced infrastructure investment contributes to poor economic performance, while lack of
institutional strength reduces governments’ ability to raise taxes effectively.
                                                       
2 Evidence has been found for a temporary increase in investment caused by stock market liberalisation, that is, a
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Most direct for the poor will be the effect of even the disproportionately small cut in transfers.
Despite the relative protection afforded to this category of spending, the impact may be great
nonetheless, since transfers to the poorest will form a very great part of their total incomes; and
these are incomes they can already ill afford to see cut. Clearly, though, the impact of reduced
levels of government finance will hit the poorest groups hardest. It is not only reductions in
spending which have costs, however, but also reductions in the stability of government finances.
Since government revenues are volatile, their ability to commit to programs of expenditure is
undermined. As well as undermining the stability of those who rely on transfers to attain some
minimal standard of living, it also reduces governments’ ability to attract complementary private
investment, hence reducing their overall potential to assist development. Toye (2000) details the
relative instability of various sources of finance. Most unstable is aid, and recent evidence shows
that aid flows have been not only volatile but also strongly pro-cyclical.
3 The most stable source
of government finance has been through debt and money creation. Arguably, given the observed
failure of aid to assist in smoothing government expenditures, these are the only stability-
enhancing tools available to governments. However, money creation has significant inflationary
consequences, and inflation has costs for the poor in particular because of their inability to
acquire ‘inflation-proof’ assets. Moreover, the poor (in the formal sector at least) are subject to
the phenomenon of ‘fiscal drag’ – the impact of inflation in effectively lowering the level of
income tax bands – which is extremely regressive in income distribution terms.
4
This leaves debt as the sole most effective tool for governments to smooth their expenditures and
protect the poorest. CAL opens domestic bond markets to international investors, and hence
allows greater liquidity for governments and also domestic corporate bond-issuers. The ability of
governments to raise additional finance through bond issues, however, is subject, and much more
directly, to the market discipline and fiscal policy issues which are discussed below.
Notwithstanding the potential benefits here, the effects of financial and especially CAL on the
ability of governments to raise finance through debt acquisition may be damaging, however, as
the following on market discipline and macroeconomic management will explain.
The remainder of this section concentrates on explaining how both the level and stability of
government finances are negatively affected by CAL. It is worth pointing out here that the
discussion that follows does not assume that governments, if unrestrained by liberalisation, will
necessarily follow efficient pro-poor growth strategies. However, it seems uncontroversial to state
that having stronger and more stable finances will allow governments greater freedom to choose
such a strategy if they wish.
Managing capital inflows
CAL most directly reduces the overall level of government budgets available for fiscal
expenditure by diverting expenditures to other avenues; in particular, to managing the associated
capital inflows. As Henry (2000) showed, liberalisation is a significant factor in triggering equity
flow booms. Liberalisation may also result in increased bond, bank and (possibly) direct
investment inflows. These inflows, and most especially the short-term flows which are less stable,
put upward pressure on the domestic exchange rate because investors purchase local currency to
invest in the stock market. To prevent exchange rate appreciation – which raises the cost of
exports and lowers those of imports, and can thus reduce domestic production damagingly – the
                                                       
3 This problem has been especially marked in African recipient countries, and with regard to the multilateral donors.
See Pallage & Robe (2000) for details.
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government must sell domestic currency and buy the incoming foreign exchange, thereby building
up their reserves of foreign currency.
This would increase the domestic money supply by the amount in question, however, leading to
inflationary pressures and associated problems, so a common next step is to sterilise the inflow.
This is achieved by selling the equivalent value of government bonds to return the money supply
to its original level and prevent the emergence of inflationary pressure. This counteracts the
money supply expansion because selling bonds involves taking domestic currency in exchange,
and hence reduces the available money supply – which in turn reduces the impetus for prices to
rise.
The government has in effect increased its liabilities – in the form of bonds issued – but also
increased its assets by the same amount, in the form of foreign exchange reserves. Assuming these
reserves are held as interest-bearing assets, commonly US Treasury bills, the government has not
necessarily worsened its position. The effect on government budgets should be negligible then.
However, the price to the government of these manoeuvres – omitting transactions costs – will in
fact depend on the interest rate differential between the developing country and (in this case) the
US rate.
Stiglitz (2000) gives the following example. If a company in the developing country borrows
$100m from a US bank, then since it is perceived as relatively highly risky, it must pay 20%
interest. If the government holds foreign exchange reserves (in US T-bills) to offset this
borrowing, it receives 5% interest. The annual cost to the poor country of this arrangement is then
$15m. The cost to the government, if it is carrying out full sterilisation, may be different. If the
government has sold bonds to the value of $100m, to maintain a stable money supply, and – being
relatively risky, but less than the company in question – pays 15% on this debt, the direct cost to
the government is $10m a year.
5
While this is the value in foregone fiscal expenditure, the actual cost in foregone investment may
be greater given that efficient government investment would have levered in private investment
also. The effect of the capital inflows is to seriously reduce the level of government expenditure
then. Moreover, since reserve accumulation – and hence the current and future level of
government expenditure - must react to volatile short-term flows, there is a further price to pay in
terms of increased uncertainty of government finances.
To compound these costs of sterilisation, the widely-held view (with regard to industrialised
countries at least) is that it cannot be successfully operated as a long term policy. This is because
the inflows are generally the result of an interest rate differential between the domestic and
international markets. Sterilisation, involving the issue of more bonds (presumably at the same or
a higher interest rate to ensure demand) will not address this problem and may exacerbate it, and
therefore cannot be a long-term solution. One other negative impact of sterilisation is that – as has
been observed in many, especially African, developing countries – government bond issues
                                                       
5 Note that a similar calculation for sterilising net inflows to all developing countries would imply a cost of $9.6bn in
1998 (or a staggering $32bn in 1996). However, the question of how CAL affects interest rates has not been fully
answered. Williamson & Mahar (1998) find that financial liberalisation was followed by higher real interest rates in
Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and the US, but lower
rates in a number of others including Israel, Italy and the UK. A corresponding survey for capital account
liberalisation does not exist (to the author’s knowledge). On the whole, however, CAL should provide momentum to
a process of equalisation of risk-adjusted rates. Since developing country governments’ debts are relatively risky,
this implies that they are likely to have to pay a higher real (non-risk-adjusted) interest rate on their liabilities (bonds
issued) than they receive on their reserve assets (T-bills purchased), although not necessarily by as much as the 15%
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dominate the market to the exclusion of other issuers except the largest corporates. In other words,
following a policy of sterilisation may exacerbate the problems of domestic industry in raising
debt financing for investment.
An alternative to sterilisation is provided by the IMF’s ‘monetary programming model’ (Khan &
Huq, 1990). Assume the focus of government policy is to prevent a depreciation of the exchange
rate. This desire stems from the associated inflationary pressure: firstly imports become more
expensive, and secondly cheaper exports increase the foreign demand for domestic production
which in turn drives up domestic prices also. Under this assumption, governments will therefore
be holding monetary policy tight (reducing deficits or building up surpluses in the budget) to
combat inflationary pressures. Autonomous inflows (of foreign capital) reduce the downward
pressure on the exchange rate and allow a relaxation of monetary policy (and hence increased
growth), while outflows increase downward pressure and require a monetary contraction.
While this appears to represent a beneficial response to inflows (if the underlying assumption is
reasonable), there are obvious costs. Policy will necessarily follow the cycle of foreign capital
flows, which have been seen to be highly pro-cyclical with countries’ economic conditions, rather
than acting to stabilise the economy. In this scenario then, this model encourages pro-cyclical
government policy – increased spending in booms, and cutbacks during recessionary outflow
periods – and hence increased macroeconomic volatility. The choice between sterilisation and
programming then is not an attractive one – the management of capital inflows has costs in terms
of increased instability of government finances and the macroeconomy more generally, and also
of reduced expenditure under the sterilisation case at least.
Market discipline
The second key channel through which CAL affects the level and stability of government finances
is the mechanism of market discipline. The concept of market discipline reflects the sensitivity of
investors to certain government policy variables. In theory, governments “are ‘forced’ to have
good economic policies, lest capital flow out of the country” (Stiglitz, 2000, p.1080). Although
Stiglitz does not make the distinction, ‘good’ policies are those which investors perceive as
consistent with strong investment returns. In practice, since investors base their decisions on only
a very narrow range of information, changes in the level of governments’ deficits, inflation (or
expected inflation) and short-term indebtedness ratios in particular, can lead to very rapid
adjustments of investors’ portfolios. This apparent myopia is in part determined by the evaluation
methods of the influential international credit ratings agencies.
6
For a developing country with a liberalised capital account, the resultant changes can involve
inflows or more particularly outflows of great magnitude relative to the total size of the economy.
The importance of avoiding such recession-inducing flows therefore ties government hands in
important areas of macroeconomic policy: market discipline acts as a deterrent against allowing
high levels of inflation or running fiscal deficits. Countries which maintain significant controls on
short-term flows, by contrast, can use countercyclical macroeconomic policy to smooth recessions
and reduce macroeconomic volatility; China is just one example. CAL therefore constrains the
possible level of governments’ fiscal expenditures.
                                                       
6 Collier & Gunning (1999) refer to two particular pieces of work reflecting the underlying flaws: “…Haque et al.
(1998) show that while the three major investor risk ratings are largely explicable in terms of policy fundamentals,
they have a high degree of persistence and the dummy for Africa is large and significant. Hence, newly reformed
countries in Africa find that their ratings are slow to change, and that they are contaminated by a ‘bad
neighbourhood’ effect. Jaspersen et al. (1998) show that the risk ratings are significant in regressions of private
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It is interesting to draw out two implications of the above discussion. Firstly, if fiscal deficits are
used by (some) developing countries to efficiently promote investment and protect the poor, the
market discipline of CAL will reduce the ability of these governments both to crowd in private
investment and to target the poorest of their citizens through a social safety net. In other words,
CAL will have negative poverty effects directly (through government expenditures) and
indirectly, through reduced investment and growth.
Secondly though, where governments are using fiscal deficits inefficiently, the market discipline
effect of liberalisation will be to curtail the wasteful use of limited resources. While there may be
no direct poverty effects of this, crowding out of private investment by inefficient government
expenditure may cease, with concomitant positive effects for investment (quality at least) and
hence growth. This explains a preliminary result found by Kraay (1998) which goes against the
received wisdom: that “investment is significantly more likely to increase in countries with bad
policies/institutions than in good countries” (p.24). While Kraay suggests that this may stem from
the superior ability of ‘good’ countries to prevent irrational post-liberalisation booms, the market
discipline explanation given here seems a more likely explanation. Since market discipline
restricts good policy-making, CAL has the highest costs for relatively well-governed economies.
Taxation and capital mobility
Two further avenues through which CAL can affect government finances and poverty are the
linked issues of capital mobility and taxation. Most obviously, the associated macroeconomic
volatility may make tax revenues increasingly variable because of the instability of the underlying
output, employment and investment. Also of concern are the potential for capital flight after the
removal of controls, the impact of increased capital mobility on the incidence of taxation and the
effects of tax competition between countries. These are treated in turn.
Capital flight may be defined as the transfer of funds out of countries motivated by domestic
economic and political uncertainty (Schineller, 1997), but is often used to refer to all flows from
capital-scarce to capital-abundant economies. Strictly defined, flight ought to involve illegal and
undeclared capital movements, and there is an extensive literature detailing attempts to measure
these flows.
7 Our concern here is with the effect of removing controls.
However, as FitzGerald & Cobham (2000b) detail, the extent of illegal capital flight from
developing countries is already large, and the findings of Doolley & Kletzer (1994) imply that
CAL in fact may tend to act in reverse. That is, when domestic financial markets are liberalised
and it is known that outward flows will not be unduly restricted, domestic flight capital tends to
reassert a ‘home bias’ and return to the market in significant quantities. The actual effect of
liberalisation on flight may be generally positive then in increasing domestic investment by
domestic capital-holders. However, even in the case of Uganda – whose 1997 liberalisation has
been seen as beneficial thus far, and largely through the return of flight capital – it is clear that the
improvement of conditions for investors was the driving factor.
The more particular danger concerning the potential for large-scale ‘flight’ is that it will lead to
the tax burden falling more heavily on the less mobile factor – labour. To encourage inflows and
avoid inducing capital outflows, governments have an incentive to tax capital less. Since workers
are relatively immobile, and tax revenues must be maintained if government expenditure is not to
suffer, the tax burden will fall more heavily on labour. This has regrettable distributive
implications.  The (relative) reduction of taxes on capital is in effect a reduction of taxes on those
with greater wealth. Moreover, taxing labour more instead affects the poorest most heavily – their
                                                       
7 See FitzGerald & Cobham (2000b) for a comprehensive survey.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 10
income from work forms a proportionately larger part of their total income than that of capital
owners. The very poorest may be protected to the extent that they are not in fact part of the formal
economy, and hence unaffected by changes to the taxation system. However, changes which
increase the burden of taxation on labour will inevitably increase the disincentive for the poor to
move into the formal sector.
8
Finally in this section, we turn to tax competition between developing countries for capital flows,
and in particular for FDI. Many developing countries – particularly the smaller ones – attempt to
attract foreign investment through tax incentive policies in an attempt to compensate for local
distortions and inefficiencies, or to simply prevent foreign investment from going to neighbouring
or similar countries. However, such incentives play a limited role as determinants of foreign
investment, and even where successful – e.g. in some export promotion zones - involve significant
fiscal costs.
9
Tax competition affects the poorest countries most, and disproportionately so. Haufler & Wooton
(1999) show how tax competition between industrialised countries for foreign direct investment
can lead to all of the benefits of investment being obtained by the multinationals.  This justifies
the OECD and EU measures taken to prevent such harmful competition between their respective
members.
10 The problem is more acute for poorer countries, however, since individually they face
even higher tax elasticity of investment. That is, the level of direct investment will be more
sensitive to the tax rate in a small developing country than in a large bloc of industrialised
countries like the EU.
This effect occurs because the cost of ignoring one small developing country is also small for the
multinational. Region-wide agreements such as the EU’s make the economic importance of the
players more significant, and hence reduce the tax elasticity of investment. While this may
provide some respite, however, ultimately the only solution is a universal one which involves both
developing and industrialised countries together. The effects of one developing country acting
unilaterally to stop tax competition for FDI would simply be to eliminate a large part of that
country’s FDI flow. Only by working together can governments prevent the benefits being
competed away to the multinationals.
While foreign direct investment is acknowledged then as the most positive form of capital flow to
liberalise, agreement on tax and subsidy competition is necessary to ensure some of the benefits
accrue to the host countries and that tax revenues are not unduly undermined. Finally, it should be
noted that tax competition for portfolio investment does not occur in the same way. While long-
term investments can be attracted by one-time payments or subsidies, portfolio investment is
instantly reversible, so ongoing payments (or perhaps subsidies on introduced capital controls)
would be required.
                                                       
8 Note that this effect of potential capital flight is compounded by a different effect of actual outflows. Outflows will
erode the tax base (by reducing the total stock of capital and labour in the economy). Even if the tax structure is
unchanged by capital flight, proportionally more tax will fall on the remaining capital and labour. Since the
percentage of transferable (capital) assets of a person will generally be lower, the poorer he or she is, the poor are
least able to avail themselves of the potential for capital flight and suffer most from the changed balance of taxation.
9 See, e.g., UNCTAD, 1999: “There was consensus [among the experts assembled by UNCTAD] that while [tax]
incentives have their pros and cons, their role essentially remains subsidiary. More fundamental factors are political
and economic stability, project feasibility, market considerations, investment climate and infrastructure” (p.9).
10 Both the OECD and the EU have recently adopted non-binding instruments for dealing with potentially harmful
preferential tax regimes – in recognition of the dangers for industrialised countries of such competition. FitzGerald &
Cobham (2000a) emphasise the importance of the association of non-OECD countries with these.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 11
However, competition for portfolio investment does appear in different forms. This involves
deliberate government measures to facilitate the use of tax havens or loopholes. For example, the
BIBF in Thailand has been used to funnel low-tax capital into the country, and in particular was
heavily used in the post-crisis ‘fire-sale’ of domestic assets to international investors. India’s
recent attempt to prevent the use of Mauritius as a tax-avoiding point of entry to the country’s
capital markets was quietly abandoned for fear of chasing away investment. The phenomenon
extends beyond developing countries too; for example, the deliberate US loophole which results
in the British Virgin Islands being technically responsible for almost as large a share of US banks’
liabilities as the UK itself.
11
Arguably, this may be more damaging than FDI competition, since it does not even allow
governments any opportunity to be selective – whereas in the latter, subsidies can be directed to
the chosen industrial sector or regional location. However, there is as yet no serious body of
research on competition in the use of tax havens and other avoidance measures, and their
developmental implications.
Some conclusions for government finance and the poor
Capital inflows (especially short-term) lead to particular problems for government finance.
Through the management of capital inflows, through the associated market discipline, and through
changes in governments’ tax-raising ability, both the level and stability of government finances
are undermined, and macroeconomic stability is also threatened. The implications for the poor are
disturbing. Historically, the burden of reducing fiscal budgets has fallen most heavily on
infrastructure investments, which is arguably the most important area for investment if developing
countries are ever going to approach their industrialised counterparts in economic terms. The
reductions in social spending (although generally proportionally smaller) also have very damaging
consequences for the poor. In particular, reductions in health and education budgets have
extensive long-term impacts for the poorest most of all.
The increased instability of government finances significantly reduces their ability to crowd in
private investment, as does macroeconomic instability. The impact of opening domestic bond
markets, although positive in increasing liquidity, contributes strongly to the reduction of
monetary policy efficacy through the vehicle of market discipline. The high and dangerous
volatility of private capital flows is exacerbated by official flows also. Since they exhibit both
volatility and pro-cyclicality, they are currently contributing to, rather than minimising, precisely
the instability which CAL incurs.
As well as these costs to the poor through the channel of government finances, perhaps the key
danger of CAL is that of macroeconomic instability. In particular, the associated costs are of
potentially reduced investment, employment and growth. The effects on poverty through access to
credit, industrial investment and performance, are investigated in the following section.
4. LIBERALISATION AND INDUSTRY
To examine the impact of CAL on poverty through structural and performance changes in
industry, it is necessary to treat separately the different maturities of capital flow. Foreign direct
investment, as a longer-term flow, is not associated with instability in the same way as short-term
bank lending and equity flows. Its impact for poverty is not clear, however. On the one hand, the
potential positive impact of FDI in terms of both real investment, export levels, technological
capability-building and human capital accumulation can be significant.
                                                       
11 US Dept of Commerce data – see FitzGerald & Cobham, 2000a.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 12
On the other hand, however, a number of caveats about the positive impacts should be
highlighted. The competitive effects on a market of entry by a well-backed multinational company
can be destructive; if domestic firms are unable to compete, the ultimate market size may shrink,
reducing employment. Furthermore, multinationals are more likely to source their inputs from
abroad, which both reduces the level of domestic employment generated and weakens the
recipient country’s trade balance. Finally, affiliates of multinationals tend to be less labour-
intensive than domestic firms (especially SMEs) and the employment (and household income)
effects must be borne in mind. Durham’s finding (2000c) of an ambiguous effect on growth is
compounded by country-specific work – e.g. Sharma (2000) finds that the well-known and
substantial FDI inflows to India have had no statistically significant effect on exports.
In this section we therefore focus on two more directly poverty-related channels. First, the
differential impact of short-term capital flows’ instability on different sizes of firm, and what this
means for employment, is considered. We then turn to the differential impact of changes in credit
allocation and the availability of financial services more generally for the poor.
Liberalisation, macroeconomic uncertainty and financing firms’ investment
Short-term capital inflows, and the resultant macroeconomic instability, have a number of
important consequences for domestic industry. What is particularly significant here is the
asymmetric impact of increased levels of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms.
12 That is, smaller
firms are disproportionately badly affected by the potential for volatility which CAL incurs in
developing countries. As was seen in section II, the channel of credit from to and from the
domestic financial sector can very quickly dry up, and this danger is especially strong for smaller
firms. The potential impacts are detailed below, but first it is useful to list some stylised facts
about smaller firms.
The importance of smaller firms in terms of employment provision and stability are well-
documented for industrialised economies (Cobham, 1999). In particular, smaller enterprises
account for the bulk of employment in many economies, and especially those of poorer countries.
The European Observatory for SMEs (small and medium-sized firms) provides data on the
relative dominance of employment by different sized-firms in the Europe-19.
13 While large firms
(employing more than 250 employees) dominate in the richer economies (e.g. Germany, France,
the Netherlands, the UK), poorer economies are dominated by SMEs (10-250 employees, e.g.
Portugal, Ireland) or even VSEs (up to 10 employees, e.g. Spain, Italy and Greece).
If anything, the dominance of VSEs and SMEs is greater in developing economies, where larger
firms are fewer and microenterprises provide much of the employment. Since smaller firms tend
to more labour-intensive and less capital-intensive, their employment contribution is relatively
greater. In poorer countries, where capital is relatively scarce, this effect is exaggerated. Mead &
Leidholm (1998) survey the available data and show that the share of microenterprises or VSEs in
employment (of those aged 15-64) runs from 17% to 27%: Botswana 17%, Kenya 18%, Lesotho
17%, Malawi 23%, Swaziland 26%, Zimbabwe 27% and the Dominican Republic 19%. With the
exception of the latter, the employment in question is predominantly in rural, non-town areas, and
in commerce rather than manufacturing. The majority of VSEs are owned by females and employ
                                                       
12 UNCTAD’s Trade & Development Report (1996) shows that even advanced countries have seen basic
macroeconomic variables – i.e. consumption, investment, trade – become more volatile since financial liberalisation.
CAL provokes a parallel but potentially more extreme reaction.
13 A country is said to be dominated by very small enterprises (VSEs), SMEs or large-sized enterprises (LSEs),
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a majority of female workers. Overall then, the poverty implications of changes in the small firm
sector are significant.
One other notable feature of the sector is its high death rates: typically 50% after 5 years, even in
industrialised countries (Cobham, 1999). This section therefore focuses on the implications for the
sector’s ability to provide employment (generally among the poorest groups) of liberalisation. The
channel through which this is achieved is that of the macroeconomic instability generated.
The general effects of uncertainty about macroeconomic and market-specific prospects on
investment have been analysed extensively through the literature on the ‘real options’ approach
(see Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Essentially, the models show how investment can be either increased
or reduced by the level of uncertainty faced by firms in a market. While this effect may act in
either direction, Cobham (2000) shows how uncertainty impacts most strongly on the investments
of smaller firms, and leads to their observed high death rates and lower growth rates. This occurs
because smaller firms are financially constrained, and the macroeconomic volatility associated
with CAL exacerbates this phenomenon.
The classic Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) model of credit rationing shows how banks will refuse credit
to firms or for projects which are viable, essentially on the basis that obtaining the necessary
information on the firms and their investment projects would be too expensive. Combining this
with the theory of investment under uncertainty shows how smaller firms are constrained to make
relatively bad decisions – decisions which are more time-constrained, and inevitably result in
more volatile outcomes. This causes in particular the high death rates of SMEs which are
observed in both developed and developing countries. Moreover, SMEs’ expectation of their
ability to access funds will be a crucial determinant of both their investment decisions and
performance, and hence of their employment capacity; and since CAL increases firms’
uncertainty about their financing, the ultimate effect may be to increase poverty.
This problem is exacerbated in many developing countries by the especially weak position of
SMEs. Affiliates of foreign multinationals by their very nature are largely exempt from local
financing constraints. Large domestic companies or groups generally have preferential access to
bank credit, and are thus relatively protected from capital market fluctuations (see FitzGerald,
1995). SMEs are the most vulnerable then to capital outflow-induced shifts in credit availability,
and the concomitant impact on the poor can be strongly negative. Further research is clearly
needed on the workings of this channel in developing countries, and indeed the structure of
industry more generally to ascertain the extent to which industrialised country results are
paralleled.
The alternative source of financing is through equity. There is a considerable literature on possible
connections between stock market development – and in particular CAL in this area – and
investment and growth of developing countries (see Durham, 2000a). However, the only strong
finding of a benefit is of a one-off increase in investment (Henry, 2000), but no long-run increase
in the capital stock (Levine & Zervos, 1998). In any case the benefits of equity markets will not be
directly felt by smaller firms and so the employment impacts will be less. Equity markets are of
course dominated by large firms and privatised state firms. Only in the largest developing
countries such as China have secondary boards – stock markets aimed at allowing smaller firms to
raise funds for investment – been at all successful.
Small firms struggle to attract finance through the market because of their informational opacity,
so the effort put into the development of such stock markets may not be worthwhile for at least
smaller lower-income countries where they cannot be fully supported. A further argument againstQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 14
focusing efforts too directly on stock market as opposed to other financial development is an
incentive may be generated for disintermediation, the trend for banks to devote greater
proportions of their resources to capital market investment rather than business lending, where the
latter would be more directly productive in terms of employment benefits. While some studies
have implied a correlation between stock market development and overall ease of financing, as
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1999) report, they find no correlation between stock market
activity and smaller firms’ ability to access debt.
China provides an interesting case for consideration, as her slow but steady progress towards
financial and at least partial CAL has been characterised by a problem particular to transition
economies. On the one hand, the large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are being privatised, and
are rationalising vast swathes of their workforces. China (despite some ideological misgivings) is
therefore desperate to encourage small, private enterprises as the only alternative source of
employment (and indeed growth). The flows of funds for investment to this particular sector is
crucial then, and hence the interest in secondary board markets. However, the financial
liberalisation which is continuing apace is having rather contrary consequences.
Part of the WTO agreement in place requires that foreign banks’ access to domestic markets be
greatly increased within a fairly short timeframe. Domestic banks are therefore being hurriedly
prepared for the harshest market conditions they have ever faced. At the same time as seeking the
necessary profitability (and clearing their books of bad loans), they are trying to deal with the
need to find profitable lending opportunities without incurring the same bad loan problems again.
Moreover, they are being urged to make funds available to the newly approved private enterprises
– who by definition have little in the way of credit histories or track records of business success
by which to signal their creditworthiness.
The result of these competing pressures is that banks are building up large quantities of unlent
deposits, since the privatised SOEs are no longer demanding loans in the same quantities, and are
not policy-designated lending targets, while the banks are attempting to introduce market-based
risk assessment techniques to prevent bad lending , and hence SMEs are being very strictly
rationed. The effects of the ongoing financial and CAL then are being seen as a squeeze on
lending to already underfunded SMEs, with the inevitable knock-on impacts of reduced
investment, growth and employment.
While their banks may not have bad loans to the same extent, it can be surmised that smaller
developing countries may feel the same effects in terms of greater rationing. Policymakers then
are faced with the quandary of liberalising their financial markets and abdicating influence on the
targeting of funds, while at the same time seeing the main employment providers of their
economies suffering a credit withdrawal. The resultant poverty impacts then may be large, even if
the ultimate growth effects (of eventually more efficient financial markets) are beneficial.
Overall, it appears that the increased macroeconomic instability associated with liberalisation of
short-term flows will mitigate against smaller firms’ investment – or at least that those
investments will be more volatile through the impact of greater uncertainty, and hence less likely
to be successful. The high death rates noted above may be exaggerated further. This would reduce
the employment capacity of the economy, with resultant negative impacts on poverty. This is a
key hypothesis which requires empirical investigation (although quality of data on firms’
investments is problematic in developed countries, and – as Cook & Nixson (2000) discuss –
rather more so in developing countries). To investigate further the impact of CAL on industry, it is
useful to consider the differential impact in allocation of credit.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 15
Liberalisation and credit availability
Financial sector deregulation – including CAL changes in the freedom both of domestic banks to
undertake international transactions, and of foreign banks to enter the domestic market – has
important ramifications for the availability and allocation of credit. As is evident from the above
discussion on SME investment, this can in turn have significant effects on both investment and
growth, and employment and poverty. Granting domestic banks the freedom to allocate credit on a
pure profit basis can have a number of effects. That predicted by theory is the most positive:
simply that banks now compete freely, and hence become more efficient in their credit allocation,
make fewer bad loans, support more profitable projects, generate more profits to reallocate and
thus facilitate both more and better investments.
Gregorio & Guidotti (1992) find for a set of 98 developed and developing countries that about
three-quarters of the positive effects of financial sector development result from this type of effect
and hence superior quality of investments, and only the remaining quarter from greater quantity of
investment. Even then, Brownbridge & Gayi (1999) survey the changes resulting from financial
reforms in eight LDCs – Bangladesh, Laos, Nepal, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zambia – and find that only Nepal showed a significant rise in private sector bank borrowing. In
other words, the observed increase in financial activity may only relate to government operations,
and not involve any greater (employment-enhancing) investment by firms.
A further concern stems from the informal sector nature of much developing country SME
operations. It is possible – as Taylor (1988) argues – that the effect of liberalisation is simply to
shift the origin of SME financing from the informal to the formal sector, and hence there will be
no net benefit in terms of investment volume. Kariuki (1995) confirms this for Kenya’s financial
liberalisation, showing that the average volume of credit among a sample of firms actually fell in
every year from 1985 to 1990, except for a 1.5% rise in 1986.
The allocative effects in terms of sector and firm size are also unclear. Jaramillo et al. (1992)
conclude that, in the case of Ecuador, financial liberalisation led to more technologically efficient
firms receiving a greater share of credit. However, these happen to have been also the largest
firms, and it was the previously subsidised smaller firms which suffered a credit withdrawal. As
with China today, the impact of liberalisation was to increase credit-rationing among SMEs. If
this effect can be predicted then, the question for a government considering liberalisation is
whether the positive growth effects of greater credit allocation to more efficient larger firms
outweighs any employment costs of reduced credit to SMEs.
The granting of domestic entry to foreign banks and financial institutions would be expected to
have similar effects in terms of increased competition and efficiency. Foreign entrants will bring
new technologies, new techniques and expertise in risk assessment, which will (at least
eventually) filter through to domestic rivals. This should then improve the quality of loans made,
and reduce the extent of credit rationing since banks will be better able to assess their limited
information on firms. A number of dangers are also present however.
The danger of precipitating crisis is compounded by the possibility of increased competition
initiating a number of negative impulses in the sector. Reducing the costs of a branch network
may have negative consequences for rural dwellers especially. Since rural branches serve a less
densely populated area, they may be the obvious choices for closure. Since rural areas are already
relatively underbanked (in terms of geographic concentration, though not necessarily by
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services. This has potential costs through reduced saving and investment in rural communities,
and hence of reduced output and employment (or subsistence) levels.
Matin, Hulme & Rutherford (1999) point out the success of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia in setting
up sub-branch units to reach a mass rural clientele and hence broadening significantly the
provision of financial services to the poorest, but this is not a common phenomenon in the wake
of financial deregulation. Brownbridge & Gayi (1999) found that entrance into the banking
sectors of their eight countries did tend to lead to investment, to longer opening hours, the opening
of ATMs, use of debit and credit cards – in other words, increased access to financial services –
but only in urban areas. Only the purchase of a rival’s rural branch network by Finance Bank
(Zambia) went against this trend.
Reducing the costs of non-performing loans and risk assessment are potentially contradictory
aims. If banks choose to target the extent of their poor quality loans, this will involve taking
greater care with future lending decisions. Investing in improved risk assessment methods and
information about potential borrowers should reduce rationing and improve the access to credit of
sound businesses (especially the disproportionately rationed SMEs). The easier option however
may be to introduce more rationing for smaller firms, and focusing on less informationally opaque
larger firms – as seen in China and probably Kariuki'’s (1995) Kenyan firms.
Reducing the costs of risk assessment can also involve disintermediation – transferring deposits to
(possibly international) capital markets where information is readily available and risks fairly
clearly seen, rather than lending them out to businesses. This has obvious negative effects for the
quality of industry investment and resulting employment and poverty levels, although the risk of
financial crisis may be lessened.
The alternative response to increased competition involves increasing revenues. This will
essentially take the form of raising interest rates on lending, but this may be through redirecting
lending to higher risk groups or alternatively to (possibly international) capital markets where
returns may be higher.  The first of these will have the obvious dangers of raising the risk in the
bank’s portfolio, and without proper supervision can precipitate crisis. The second will reduce the
volume of lending available directly to businesses, and hence increase the extent of rationing for
smaller firms which cannot access capital markets themselves.
The case of liberalisation giving freedom to domestic banks to transact internationally has been
touched on already. The potential for domestic savings to be channelled abroad to international
capital markets will lower the availability of credit to domestic firms, although the entrance of
foreign banks may compensate for this. The crisis-inducing possibility is the danger of domestic
financial institutions without sufficient expertise or supervision seeking funds from foreign
financiers without taking into account the exchange risk or the possibility of short-term loans not
being rolled over, as in the East Asian crisis.
Finally, we need to consider in more detail the effects of liberalisation and increased competition
on rural access to credit. A key feature of especially African developing countries has been the
overwhelming absence of deposit-taking institutions willing to handle small sums operating in
rural areas. Mosley (2000) notes that this continued unabated after a series of financial
liberalisation reforms in Kenya (1982-4), Malawi (1985-7 ad 1994-6), Uganda (1992-4) and
Lesotho (1994-6). Mosley’s findings for the impact of liberalisation on access to credit make
unsurprising reading: namely, that liberalisation brought few direct benefits, but the innovation of
(especially NGO) credit institutions increased access (to some financial services at least)
dramatically in both Kenya and Uganda where the NGOs were most active. More worryingly,QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 17
even in these cases, the access of the very poorest groups did not significantly increase despite the
improvement for more marginal individuals below but closer to the poverty line.
Increased competition has not had any noticeable impact on the microfinance institutions. That is,
despite the success of, for example, the PCEA Chogoria in Kenya and the CCEI/Gatsby Trust
scheme in Cameroon, private sector competitors have not moved in. Furthermore, liberalisation
specifically of the microfinance sector has had serious negative effects: in Malawi, the
privatisation of the (failing) SACA and Malawi Mudzi Fund led the new company to seek
collateral for its credit provision, and hence de facto disqualify a large sector of the poor from
access. Mosley makes the more general points that while this type of liberalisation may have bad
effects for poverty, both conventional liberalisation of the interest rate (allowing lending at an
interest rate of around 40%, as is common among the microfinance institutions to cover the high
costs of networks in rural areas) and policies to promote institutional development can have very
promising effects.
Matin et al. (1999) survey financial services provision for the poorest in low-income countries and
find two trends in particular. One is a general trend towards more low-level, informal financial
intermediation (e.g. the return of deposit collectors in Nigeria after a fall in confidence in the
banking system); and the other, more situation-specific responses from formal institutions (e.g.
the doorstep financial services offered in Dhaka slums by SafeSave). Matin et al.’s paper is
subtitled ‘Deepening Understanding to Improve Provision,’ and our understanding of the overall
effects of CAL on domestic industry and credit access are far from clear. The apparent absence of
research on the preconditions for CAL to improve (or at least leave unchanged) the access of
domestic firms to credit is indeed paralleled by the absence of research to indicate the
preconditions for CAL to be at least poverty-neutral. A deeper understanding of the channels
involved is required then, even for purely domestic financial liberalisation.
It is clear then that the macroeconomic instability associated with CAL affects domestic firms’
investments negatively, and especially SMEs, so one effect of liberalising short-term flows may
in many cases be to reduce the growth of the economy’s major employment-providing sector.
The opening of the domestic financial sector raises a great number of questions about where
increased competition will lead under different initial conditions, but these questions remain
unanswered for lack of research. Research is also required to fully understand the structure of
industry in developing countries and its response to changing financial conditions, and also the
development of provision of financial services to the poorest.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has set out a framework for further analysis of the linkages between CAL and poverty.
While theory implies there will be efficiency benefits for international finance, the existence of
growth benefits for developing countries – of both short term flows and FDI – has simply not
been established. Moreover, a variety of costs for liberalising countries, and a number of further
potential dangers, have been identified. The key conclusion for policy-makers is that retention of
the option to make use of capital controls within an appropriate macroeconomic policy structure
is essential. The underlying assumption that liberalisation has definite benefits is neither a useful
nor a justifiable starting place from which to begin policy analysis.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS70 Page 18
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